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Abstract The Adapted Modular Number System
(AMNS) is a sytem of representation of integers to
speed up arithmetic operations modulo a prime p. Such
a system can be defined by a tuple (p, n, γ, ρ, E) where
E ∈ Z[X ]. In [13] conditions are given to build AMNS
with E(X) = Xn+1. In this paper, we generalize their
results and show how to generate multiple AMNS for a
given prime p with E(X) = Xn − λ and λ ∈ Z. More-
over, we propose a complete set of algorithms without
conditional branching to perform arithmetic and con-
version operations in the AMNS, using a Montgomery-
like method described in [15].
Keywords Modular number system · Modular
arithmetic · Side-channel countermeasure
1 Introduction
Efficient implementations of most of modern public-
key cryptography algorithms depend on the efficiency
of the modular arithmetic implementation. Such cryp-
tosystems usually need fast arithmetic modulo integers
of size from 160 bits up to several thousand bits. Adapt-
ing or building unusual arithmetic for cryptographic
purpose may offer interesting properties.
For instance, Residue Number Systems [9] is a non
positional arithmetic which have parallel properties. This
makes them suitable for SIMD architectures [1] and
adapted to many cryptosystems [3,4,1]. Furthermore,
they have interesting leak resistant properties [5,2].
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In positional (usual) number system, a positive in-
teger N is represented in base β as follows :
N =
k−1∑
i=0
diβ
i,
where 0 6 di < β. If dk−1 6= 0, N is called a k-digit
β-base number. β is often taken as a power of two.
In modular arithmetic, the modulus p is generally
used several times and according the target architec-
ture, the base β is fixed. In such context, elements mod-
ulo p can be seen as polynomials of degree lower than
the number of digits of p in base β. In [6], Bajard and al.
introduced the Modular Number System (MNS) which
can be seen as a generalization of positional number
systems.
Definition 1 A modular number system (MNS) B is
defined by a tuple (p, n, γ, ρ), such that for every integer
0 6 x < p, there exists a vector V = (v0, . . . , vn−1) such
that:
x ≡
n−1∑
i=0
viγ
i (mod p) ,
with |vi| < ρ and 0 < ρ, γ < p.
In that case, we say that V (or equivalently the poly-
nomial V (X) = v0 + v1.X + · · ·+ vn−1.Xn−1) is a rep-
resentative of x in B and we notate V ≡ xB.
Example 1 In Table 1, we give a representative in the
MNS B = (17, 3, 7, 2) for each element modulo p = 17.
In particular, we can verify that if we evaluate −1 +
X + X2 in γ , we have −1 + γ + γ2 = −1 + 7 + 49 =
55 ≡ 4mod 17. We have also deg(−1+X+X2) = 2 < 3
and ‖ − 1 +X +X2‖∞ = 1 < 2.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 −X2 1−X2
4 5 6 7
−1 +X +X2 X +X2 −1 +X X
8 9 10 11
1 +X −X − 1 −X −X + 1
12 13 14 15 16
−X −X2 1−X −X2 −1 +X2 X2 −1
Table 1: The elements of Z/17Z in B = (17, 3, 7, 2)
An Adapted Modular Number System (AMNS) is a
MNS with a special property: γ must be a root of the
polynomialE(X) = Xn−αX−λ in (Z/pZ)[X ], where α
and λ are “small” integers. Notice that such a property
cannot be always satisfied for any tuple (p, α, λ). When
such a tuple exists, this property allows to speed up
arithmetic operations (see [16,7] for more details).
There are two strategies to build an AMNS: either
by choosing the size of the modulus p, or by choosing
the value of p. The first strategy has been studied by
Bajard and al. in [6,16]. It leads to representation sys-
tems that allow very efficient modular arithmetic. But
these AMNS are irrelevant for some cryptographic stan-
dards where the value of p is already fixed. With the
second strategy, parameters (n, γ, ρ) of the AMNS are
built from a fixed value p. For the same value p, it is
even possible to generate many distinct AMNS, which
could be an interesting property to build side-channel
resistant countermeasures. The main drawback of this
strategy is that its parameters generation is more com-
plex and also its leads to AMNS with arithmetic op-
erations generally less efficient than those of the first
strategy.
Whether the value or the size of p is fixed, arith-
metic operations (addition, multiplication) in the cor-
responding AMNS remain the same. Only one oper-
ation differs: the internal reduction. The internal re-
duction is a method that takes as input an element
X = (x0, . . . , xn−1) and outputs Y = (y0, . . . , yn−1)
such that
n−1∑
i=0
yiγ
i ≡
n−1∑
i=0
xiγ
i (mod p),
with |yi| < ρ, i.e. Y is a representative of X in B. As
soon as a product (or an addition) of two elements in
the AMNS is done, the internal reduction process may
be required to guarantee that the result still be in the
AMNS.
When only the size of p is fixed, the internal reduc-
tion is essentially a vector matrix multiplication. This
operation is very cheap because the generation process
allows to choose a very sparse matrix (see [6,16]) with
non zero elements equal to ± powers of two.
When the value of p is fixed, there is no such free-
dom, so other methods have been proposed. In [7], Ba-
jard and al. described two methods to perform the in-
ternal reduction: one using lookup tables and another
one using a Barrett-like approach. In [15], using a trick
similar to Montgomery’s modular multiplication, Ne`gre
and al. described another way to compute the inter-
nal reduction. This method is currently the best known
when p is fixed. The main difficulty is that it requires
a polynomial M ′ (see subsection 3.2) which existence
is not easy to ensure. The authors gave in [15] a condi-
tion of existence which is unfortunately not sufficient.
In [13], El Mrabet and al. choosed the polynomial E
such that α = 0, λ = −1 and showed that in this con-
text, the polynomial M ′ always exists. Unfortunately,
their proof has some issues.
In this paper, we consider the generation of an AMNS
when the value of p is already known. We prove that for
the polynomial E(X) = Xn−λ (i.e. α = 0), the polyno-
mialM ′ always exists for any λ and we explain to obtain
it. We describe a complete set of algorithms for arith-
metic operations using the Montgomery-like method for
internal reduction and we show how to generate all the
parameters needed for these algorithms.
When computing the sum of two elements in the
AMNS, a polynomial addition is done. Then an inter-
nal reduction may be required to keep the result in the
AMNS. Regardless how this reduction is done, its cost
could be too expensive compared to that of a simple
polynomial addition. In this paper, we detail an idea
that allows to build, from a parameter ∆, an AMNS
such that at most ∆ additions followed by a multiplica-
tion and only one reduction can be computed with the
corresponding result still in the AMNS. In the last part,
we talk about the implementation, give some examples
of AMNS and show some comparisons with popular big
integer libraries.
2 Arithmetic operations in AMNS
Let B = (p, n, γ, ρ, E) be an AMNS, a ∈ Z/pZ and A
its representative in B. Most of the time, an element
A will be considered as a polynomial A(X) of degree
n− 1 such that A(X) = a0 + a1.X + · · · + an−1.Xn−1
and A(γ) ≡ a (mod p).
Efficient and secure modular operations using AMNS 3
As already mentionned in the introduction, the gen-
eral form of the polynomial E is E(X) = Xn−αX−λ,
with E(γ) ≡ 0 (mod p). E is called the external reduc-
tion polynomial and it is used to reduce polynomials
which degree exceeds n− 1. In this paper, we consider
the case α = 0 (i.e E(X) = Xn−λ). This choice makes
arithmetic operations even faster. Moreover in this con-
text, finding a root γ (modulo p) of E(X) boils down
to compute a nth-root of λ modulo p (see [11]).
Proposition 1 Let B = (p, n, γ, ρ, E) be an AMNS.
The integer p satisfies p 6 (2ρ)n, hence ⌈ n√p/2⌉ 6 ρ.
Proof. The number of elements in B is (2ρ)n, as ele-
ments can have negative coefficients and their absolute
values are bounded by ρ (see definition 1). We want to
represent all elements in Z/pZ, so ρ must be such that
p 6 (2ρ)n.
For cryptographic needs, the most important op-
erations are addition and multiplication. But, as ele-
ments representation in AMNS is different from the bi-
nary one, we also need conversion methods to find a
representative of each integer modulo p in the AMNS
(and vice-versa). All these operations (conversion, addi-
tion, multiplication) will use an internal reduction pro-
cess. Let B = (p, n, γ, ρ, E) be an AMNS such that
E(X) = Xn − λ and γn ≡ λmod p, the internal re-
duction process maps a polynomial V (X) ∈ Z[X ] to
a polynomial V˜ (X) ∈ Z[X ] such that V˜ (γ) ≡ V (γ)
(mod p), ‖V˜ ‖∞ < ‖V ‖∞ and deg V˜ = deg V .
2.1 The internal reduction
In [7], the authors suggest to use a Barrett-like algo-
rithm for the reduction procedure. In [15], authors im-
prove the reduction procedure by using a Mongtomery-
like algorithm (see Algorithm 1).
Algorithm 1 RedCoeff(V ∈ Z[X ]) (Coefficient reduc-
tion)
Require: deg(V ) 6 n − 1, B = (p, n, γ, ρ, E), M ∈
B, such that M(γ) ≡ 0 (mod p), an integer φ and
M ′ ≡ −M−1 mod(E, φ).
Ensure: S(γ) = V (γ)φ−1 mod p
1: Q← V ×M ′mod (E, φ)
2: R← (V +Q×M modE)
3: S ← R/φ
4: return S
It is proved in [15] that:
Proposition 2 Let σ = ‖M‖∞. If V , ρ and σ are such
that:
‖V ‖∞ 6 n|λ|ρ2, ρ > 2|λ|nσ and φ > 2|λ|nρ
then S (the output of the algorithm 1) is such that
‖S‖∞ < ρ (i.e S ∈ B).
This property is useful for multiplication. If A and B
are two elements of B, then the coefficients of V (X) =
A(X)B(X) (mod E(X)) meet the requirements of pro-
position 2 as proved in [15]. Hence, one single call to
RedCoeff will output an element S ∈ B, such that
S(γ) ≡ A(γ)B(γ)/φ (mod p), similarly to Montgomery
modular reduction method.
Nevertheless, using this algorithm, the computation
of the product α1×α2× · · · ×αk, with αi ∈ Z/pZ, will
output a polynomial S such that S(γ) ≡ φ−k∏ki=1 αi
(mod p). In order to ensure that the operations in AMNS
are consistent, we propose to use the same idea as the
Montgomery modular reduction method: any element
a ∈ Z/pZ will be replaced by a.φ (mod p). Thus, any
element a ∈ Z/pZ will have a representative A(X) ∈ B
such that A(γ) ≡ aφ (mod p). As a consequence, if
A(X), B(X) ∈ B respectively represent a, b ∈ Z/pZ,
then the reduction procedure applied to V (X) = A(X)B(X)
(mod E(X)) will output a polynomial S ∈ B, such that
S(γ) ≡ abφ (mod p). We can now detail the conversion
operations.
Remark 1 The algorithm 1 requires the existence of a
polynomial M which is invertible mod (E, φ). We will
discuss this important point in subsection 3.2. More-
over, proposition 2 implies that ρ > ‖M‖∞, hence we
want ‖M‖∞ as small as possible.
In the sequel of the paper, we will assume that ρ >
2|λ|n‖M‖∞ and φ > 2|λ|nρ.
2.2 Conversion operations
2.2.1 Conversion from binary representation to
AMNS.
We present here two methods that can be used for
conversion from classical representation to AMNS. The
first method (inspired from [7]) involves precomputa-
tions and needs some storage capacity while the other
one is less memory consuming but needs more compu-
tations.
Method 1
First precompute representatives Pi(X) of ρ powers in
B, i.e Pi ≡ (ρi)B, for i = 1, . . . , n − 1 (see section3.4).
The conversion is then obtained using the algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 2 Conversion from classical representation
to AMNS
Require: a ∈ Z/pZ and B = (p, n, γ, ρ, E)
Ensure: A ≡ (a.φ)B
1: b = (a.φ2)mod p
2: b = (bn−1, ..., b0)ρ
3: U ←
n−1∑
i=0
bi.Pi(X)
4: A← RedCoeff(U)
5: return A
At line 3, U is a representative of a.φ2 and ‖U‖∞ <
n.ρ2. Hence from proposition 2, ‖A‖∞ < ρ and A ≡
(a.φ)B.
Method 2
RedCoeff procedure outputs S such that:
‖S‖∞ < (‖V ‖∞ + nφ|λ|σ)/φ. If ρ > 2n|λ|σ and
φ > 2|λ|nρ, this implies that:
‖S‖∞ < ‖V ‖∞2|λ|nρ + ρ2 6 ‖V ‖∞2ρ + ρ2 .
So, if ‖V ‖∞ < ρ2, then ‖S‖∞ < ρ (i.e: S ∈ B). But if
‖V ‖∞ > ρ2, then ‖S‖∞ < ‖V ‖∞/ρ. That is, one call
of RedCoeff divides the coefficients of V by at least ρ if
‖V ‖∞ > ρ2. We propose a conversion procedure based
on this fact.
Let T = φnmod (p). The algorithm 3 describes another
way to compute the conversion of an element of Z/pZ.
Algorithm 3 Conversion from binary representation
to AMNS
Require: a ∈ Z/pZ, B = (p, n, γ, ρ, E) and T =
φnmod (p)
Ensure: A ≡ (a.φ)B
1: A = (a.T )mod p /* polynomial of degree 0 */
2: for i = 1 . . . n− 1 do
3: A← RedCoeff(A)
4: end for
5: return A
As previously mentionned one single call to RedCo-
eff method divides its input coefficients by at least ρ.
At line 1, A is a polynomial of degree 0 which constant
coefficient is strictly less than p (6 ρn). As a conse-
quence, calling n− 1 times RedCoeff on A ensures that
the algorithm will output A in B with A ≡ (a.φ)B. This
method is slower than the first method , but its advan-
tage is that only the precomputation of T is needed.
Remark 2 This method always works because φn > p
(as (2.ρ)n > p and φ > 2.ρ), so φn 6= T . Otherwise, its
output A could be such that ‖A‖∞ > ρ, and so A will
not be in B.
2.2.2 Conversion from AMNS to binary
representation.
We present here a slight modification of two methods
given in [7] for computing the integer value correspond-
ing to an element in an AMNS B.
Method 1
The integer represented by A in B is the value A(γ)φ−1
(mod p). It can be computed using the classical Horner’s
method as described in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Conversion from AMNS to classical rep-
resentation
Require: A ∈ B and B = (p, n, γ, ρ, E)
Ensure: a = A(γ).φ−1 mod p
1: A← RedCoeff(A)
2: a← 0
3: for i = n− 1 . . . 0 do
4: a← (aγ +Ai)mod p
5: end for
6: return a
Method 2
This method (Alg. 5) is a simple evaluation of a poly-
nomial with precomputed powers γ modulo p. We note
them gi = γ
i (mod p), for i = 0, . . . , n− 1.
Remark 3 The two algorithms start by a call to Red-
Coeff in order to compute a polynomial B such that
B(γ) ≡ A(γ)φ−1 (mod p). Such a call is expected to
be less expensive than a direct computation of A(γ)φ−1
(mod p). In Algorithm 4, at each step of the loop, the
product of two elements of size log2(p) is computed, and
a modular reduction is done. In Algorithm 5, at each
step of the loop, the product of one element of size
log2(p) with an element of size log2(ρ) is computed.
Hence the size of the last computed value is about
log2(n)+log2(ρ)+log2(p). Only one modular reduction
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Algorithm 5 Conversion from AMNS to classical rep-
resentation
Require: A ∈ B and B = (p, n, γ, ρ, E)
Ensure: a = A(γ).φ−1 mod p
1: A← RedCoeff(A)
2: a← 0
3: for i = n− 1 . . . 0 do
4: a← a+Aigi
5: end for
6: a← a mod p
7: return a
is computed to obtain the result. This method requires
the precomputation of some powers of γ modulo p, but
is much faster than Algorithm 4.
2.3 Multiplication
Algorithm 6 Multiplication in AMNS
Require: A ∈ B, B ∈ B and B = (p, n, γ, ρ, E)
Ensure: S ∈ B with S(γ) ≡ A(γ).B(γ).φ−1 mod p
1: V ← A.BmodE
2: S ← RedCoeff(V )
3: return S
The multiplication of two polynomials increases the de-
gree of the result. As a consequence, we must first re-
duce the degree and next reduce coefficient sizes. The
reduction of the degree is done using the external reduc-
tion polynomialE. AsE(γ) ≡ 0 (mod p), then A.B(γ) ≡
V (γ) (mod p). After the external reduction, the result
V has a degree lower than n − 1 but we only have
‖V ‖∞ 6 n|λ|ρ2. So, the next and final step is to re-
duce the sizes of its coefficients with RedCoeff method
so that theirs absolute values are lower than ρ.
2.4 Addition
Algorithm 7 Addition in AMNS
Require: A ∈ B, B ∈ B and B = (p, n, γ, ρ, E)
Ensure: S = A+B
1: S ← A+B
2: return S
The addition is simply a sum of two polynomials which
doesn’t increase the result degree. However, the result
S may not satisfy ‖S‖∞ < ρ. The simplest way to have
the output S always in B is, if ‖S‖∞ > ρ, to perform a
coefficient reduction on S followed by a multipcation by
a representative of φ2, using algorithm 6. Unfortunaly,
this is too expensive for an addition.
We propose an alternative method. Suppose that,
for the target application, one needs to compute at most
∆ consecutive additions so that the final output S is
such that ‖S‖∞ 6 (∆ + 1)ρ. Suppose now that the
product S×T must be computed where T is the output
of Θ consecutive additions (0 6 Θ 6 ∆). Let S and
T be two such elements (i.e ‖S‖∞ 6 (∆ + 1).ρ and
‖T ‖∞ 6 (Θ + 1).ρ). Using algorithm 6 to multiply S
and T , one has the output W such that:
‖W‖∞ < n|λ|(∆+1)(Θ+1)ρ
2
φ +
ρ
2 .
So, as we want ‖W‖∞ < ρ, it suffices to take φ such
that:
φ > 2(∆+ 1)2|λ|nρ .
Note: For ∆ = 0, we obtain φ > 2|λ|nρ, which corre-
sponds to what was suggested by proposition 2.
Until now, we have defined the AMNS and shown
how to perform essential arithmetic operations in it. In
the following, we will show how to generate all necessary
parameters.
3 AMNS parameters generation
In this section, we describe how to generate all neces-
sary parameters of an AMNS. We assume that p is a
prime number larger than 3, thus p− 1 is always even.
We also assume that λ < p, for consistency.
The complete set of parameters of B is:
– p: a prime integer
– n: the number of coefficients of elements in the AMNS
– λ: a “small” integer.
– γ: a nth-root of λ modulo p
– ρ: the upper-bound on the ‖.‖∞ of the elements of
B.
– φ: the integer used in RedCoeff.
– E: the external reduction polynomial (E(X) = Xn−
λ)
– M : the internal reduction polynomial.
– M ′: a polynomial such thatM ′ = −M−1mod (E, φ)
– ∆: the maximum number of consecutive additions
that can be done before a multiplication (see sub-
section 2.4).
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Amongst these parameters, n and p are choosen
with regard to the target application and the target
architecture. The parameters λ and E depend on the
existence of γ (section 3.1). The proof on the existence
of the polynomials M and M ′ is detailled in section
3.2 and the generation of M in section 3.3. Finally, the
computation of the representatives of powers of ρ that
are used in the algorithm 2 is described in section 3.4.
3.1 Existence of γ
The first constraint in the generation of an AMNS is the
existence and the computation of γ, a nth-root modulo
p of λ.
Proposition 3 Let E(X) = Xn − λ, for λ ∈ Z \ {0}.
Let g be a generator of (Z/pZ)× and y such that gy ≡
λmod p. If gcd(n, p−1) | y, then there exists gcd(n, p−
1) roots γ of E(X) in Z/pZ.
Proof. If gcd(n, p−1) | y, the equation nx ≡ y (mod p−
1) has k solutions x, where k = gcd(n, p − 1). Let x0
be one of these solutions, and let consider γ ≡ gx0
(mod p− 1). Then γn ≡ λ (mod p).
Proposition 3 gives a condition that guarantees the
existence of λ nth-roots modulo p and their number.
But it requieres to compute y such that gy ≡ λmod p
(i.e the discrete logarithm of λ in Z/pZ) which can be
very hard if p is big enough. So, we give bellow sufficient
(but not necessary) conditions that are easier to satisfy
and that guarantee the existence of a nth-root modulo
p of λ, taking eventually λ = 1.
Corollary 1 If gcd(n, p − 1) = 1 then there exists a
unique nth-root γ of λ in Z/pZ, for any λ ∈ Z\{0}.
Proof. If gcd(n, p − 1) = 1, this nth-root can be easily
computed. In fact, using the extended euclidean algo-
rithm, we compute Bezout coefficients for (n, p − 1).
That is, u and v in Z such that n.u + (p − 1).v = 1.
So, λ = λn.u+(p−1).v = (λu)n.(λp−1)v. As, λp−1 ≡ 1
(mod p), it is obvious that λ ≡ (λu)n (mod p). Which
means that λu (mod p) is a nth-root modulo p of λ.
If gcd(n, p− 1) = 1 and λ = 1, then, using corollary
1, the unique nth-root γ of λ is 1. With λ = 1, an
AMNS can not be build because the maximum value
that can be computed is lower than nρ, with ρ ≈ n√p.
So, it will not be posssible to generate all elements in
Z/pZ. Below, we give a corollary for the case λ = 1.
Corollary 2 If gcd(n, p − 1) > 1 then there exists at
least one non-trivial nth-root γ of 1. So, one can take
λ = 1.
Proof. Let λ = 1, we are looking for γ such that γn ≡ 1
(mod p). It is well known that there are gcd(n, p − 1)
nth-roots of unity modulo p. Let g be a generator of
(Z/pZ)×, d = gcd(n, p − 1) with d > 1, and let h =
g(p−1)/d (mod p). Then, hn ≡ 1 (mod p) and h 6= 1.
So, h is a non-trivial nth-root of λ.
The other nth-roots are hi (mod p), for 2 6 i 6 d.
Remark 4 If gcd(n, p − 1) > 1, it is not necessary to
take λ = 1. There exists efficient algorithms (like in
[11]) that can be used to compute the nth-root of an
element λ if such a root exists.
3.2 Existence of M and M ′
Section 3.1 shows that once n is fixed, the nth-root γ
of λ can be easily obtained (taking eventually λ = 1).
To represent all elements in Z/pZ, ρ must be such that
⌈ n√p/2⌉ 6 ρ (see proposition 1).
For internal reduction, we also want ρ > 2|λ|n‖M‖∞
and φ > 2(∆+1)2|λ|nρ (as discussed in subsection 2.4).
Now, it remains to see how to generate M and M ′.
In [15], the authors state that M must be chosen such
that gcd(E,M)=1, but this does not guarantee the ex-
istence of M ′. Indeed, if gcd(E,M)=1 then it exists
M ′ ∈ Q[X ] such that MM ′ ≡ 1 (mod E), but nothing
guarantee that the coefficients ofM ′ are invertible mod-
ulo φ. Hence, there is no evidence that gcd(E,M)=1
implies that M ′M ≡ 1 (mod (E, φ)).
In section 3.3 of [14], when the value of p is already
fixed and φ is a power of 2, the authors show how to
build a lattice which reduced basis always contains a
polynomial M that is invertible modulo (E, φ). Unfor-
tunately, their proof uses the fact that a polynomial
M is invertible modulo (E, φ) as soon as the evalua-
tion of M over all integers is odd. This is a necessary
condition but not a sufficient one. As an example, let
E(X) = X6+1 and M(X) = X4+X2+1, the evalua-
tion ofM is odd over all integers but it is not invertible
modulo (E, φ) for any even value of φ because the resul-
tant of E andM is 16. This leads us to first recall some
essential elements about the resultant of two polynomi-
als. We will then give a proof of the existence ofM and
M ′.
Definition 2 (Resultant) Let A be an integral do-
main. Let A and B be two polynomials in A[X ]. The
resultant Res(A,B) of A and B is the determinant of
their Sylvester matrix. Therefore, it is an element of A.
If A(X) = a0 + a1X + · · · + anXn and B(X) =
b0 + b1X + · · ·+ bmXm, then their Sylvester matrix is
defined as follows:
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

an 0 . . . 0 bm 0 . . . 0
an−1 an
. . .
...
... bm
. . .
...
... an−1
. . . 0
...
. . . 0
...
...
. . . an b1 bm
a0 an−1 b0
. . .
...
...
0
. . .
... 0
. . . b1
...
...
. . . a0
...
...
. . . b0 b1
0 . . . 0 a0 0 . . . 0 b0


In Z[X ], there is no Bezout’s identity, but the follow-
ing essential property will help us to set an existence
criteria for the polynomial M ′(X).
Proposition 4 Let A be an integral domain and let
A and B two non-zero polynomials in A[X ] such that
deg(A)+deg(B) > 1. There exist U and V in A[X ] such
that A(X)U(X) + B(X)V (X) = Res(A,B), deg(U) <
deg(B), and deg(V ) < deg(A).
We can now state our existence criteria for the poly-
nomial M ′.
Proposition 5 (Existence criteria) Let M ∈ Z[X ],
E ∈ Z[X ] and φ > 2 an integer.
If gcd(Res(E,M), φ) = 1 then there exists M ′ ∈
Z[X ] such that M ′M ≡ 1 mod (E, φ) .
Proof. Let r = Res(E,M) and let ψ the inverse of r
modulo φ. From the proposition 4, there exist U and
V in Z[X ] such that U(X)M(X) + V (X)E(X) = r.
Hence ψU(X)M(X) + ψV (X)E(X) = ψr, which im-
plies ψU(X)M(X) ≡ 1 mod (E, φ).
Remark 5 In RedCoeff method (alg. 1), an exact di-
vision by φ is done. Because we want this method to
be fast, we usually take φ as a power of two. So for
Res(E,M) to be invertible in Z/φZ, it must be odd, as
invertible elements in Z/φZ are those which are prime
with φ.
As mentioned in remark 1, M must be chosen so
that ‖M‖∞ is as small as possible. In the sequel of this
paper, we will assume that φ is a power of two and
we are going to show how to generate M such that
Res(E,M) be odd and ‖M‖∞ be small.
3.3 Generation of the polynomial M
Let L be the lattice of all polynomials having γ as root
modulo p and whose degree is at most n− 1:
L = {a(X) ∈ Z[X ], such that: deg(a) < n and
a(γ) ≡ 0mod (p)}
The idea for finding M is to compute a reduced basis
of L using a lattice reduction algorithm (like LLL algo-
rithm for example) and then to take M as an element
(or a special combination of elements) of this reduced
basis. In order to find a suitable polynomialM , we will
distinguish two cases according to the parity of λ. We
recall that for practical reason, φ is a power of two. In
the sequel, we will use the following property:
Property 1 (Matrix determinant parity)
Let A,B ∈ Mn×n be two matrices with elements in
Z, such that: A = (aij)06i,j<n and B = (bij)06i,j<n
with bij = aij (mod 2). Then, the determinants of A
and B have the same parity.
Let E(X) = Xn − λ and M(X) = m0 + m1X +
· · ·+mn−1Xn−1. The Sylvester matrix of E and M is
defined as follows:
SM,E =


1 0 . . . 0 mn−1 0 . . . 0 0
0 1 . . . 0 mn−2 mn−1 . . . 0 0
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 . . . 1 m1 m2 . . . mn−1 0
0 0 . . . 0 m0 m1 . . . mn−2 mn−1
−λ 0 . . . 0 0 m0 . . . mn−3 mn−2
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . m0 m1
0 0 . . . −λ 0 0 . . . 0 m0


Case 1: λ is even
If λ is even, there is a very simple condition on M to
guarantee that Res(E,M) = det(SM,E) be odd.
Proposition 6 Let E(X) = Xn − λ such that λ is
even. Let M = m0 + m1X + · · · + mn−1Xn−1 be a
polynomial such that M ∈ L. Then, Res(E,M) is odd
if and only if m0 is odd.
Proof. If λ is even, then using property 1, it is obvious
that the determinant of SM,E has the same parity as
that of the following matrix, where mi = mi (mod 2):


1 0 . . . 0 mn−1 0 . . . 0 0
0 1 . . . 0 mn−2 mn−1 . . . 0 0
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 . . . 1 m1 m2 . . . mn−1 0
0 0 . . . 0 m0 m1 . . . mn−2 mn−1
0 0 . . . 0 0 m0 . . . mn−3 mn−2
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . m0 m1
0 0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . 0 m0


It is an upper triangular matrix with only the value 1 or
m0 on the diagonal and its determinant is 1 if and only if
m0 is odd. Therefore, if λ is even, thenM
−1mod (E, φ)
exists if and only if m0 is odd.
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A basis of the lattice L is:
M1 =


p 0 0 . . . 0 0
t1 1 0 . . . 0 0
t2 0 1 . . . 0 0
...
. . .
...
tn−2 0 0 . . . 1 0
tn−1 0 0 . . . 0 1


where ti = (−γ)imod (p).
Note: Here, a polynomial is represented by a row vector
corresponding to its coefficients, i.e. if A(X) = a0 +
a1X + · · ·+ an−1Xn−1, then the corresponding vector
is: (a0, a1, . . . , an−1).
Proposition 7 Let G be a reduced basis of the lattice
L obtained from the basis M1. Then, at least one (row)
vector Gi of G is such that Gi,0 is odd, (i.e Gi is a suitable
candidate for M , according to proposition 6).
Proof. G is a basis of L, so the vector P = (p, 0, . . . , 0)
(i.e the first line ofM1) is a linear combination (over Z)
of elements of G. Now, suppose that the first component
of all elements of G is even. This means that every linear
combination of elements from G will output a vector
whose first component is even. As p is odd, this is in
contradiction with the fact that P ∈ L and G is a basis
of L. Thus, at least one element Gi of G must be such
that Gi,0 is odd.
Case 2: λ is odd
Proposition 8 Let Rn = F2[X ]/(X
n − 1) be the alge-
bra of all polynomials modulo (Xn−1) over F2. Let Cn
be the ring of n× n binary circulant matrices.
Let Φ be the application defined as follows:
Φ : Rn → Cn
a0 + · · ·+ an−1Xn−1 7→


a0 a1 . . . an−2 an−1
an−1 a0 . . . an−3 an−2
.
.
.
. . .
.
.
.
a2 a3 . . . a0 a1
a1 a2 . . . an−1 a0


Then, Rn is isomorphic to Cn and Φ(Rn) = Cn.
Proof. see section 3.4 of [8].
Corollary 3 Let A ∈ Rn be a polynomial, the determi-
nant of Φ(A) is odd if and only if gcd(A,Xn − 1) = 1.
Proof. A is invertible if and only if gcd(A,Xn− 1) = 1.
An element in Cn is invertible if and only if its deter-
minant is odd. As Rn is isomorphic to Cn through Φ,
this concludes the proof.
When λ is odd, the determinant of SM,E has the
same parity than the determinant of the following ma-
trix (using property 1), where mi = mi (mod 2):


1 0 . . . 0 mn−1 0 . . . 0 0
0 1 . . . 0 mn−2 mn−1 . . . 0 0
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 . . . 1 m1 m2 . . . mn−1 0
0 0 . . . 0 m0 m1 . . . mn−2 mn−1
−1 0 . . . 0 0 m0 . . . mn−3 mn−2
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . m0 m1
0 0 . . . −1 0 0 . . . 0 m0


Using the fact that the addition of one row to another
row doesn’t change the value of the determinant, one
deduces that the determinant of the preceding matrix
is the same than the determinant of the matrix:


1 0 . . . 0 mn−1 0 . . . 0 0
0 1 . . . 0 mn−2 mn−1 . . . 0 0
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 . . . 1 m1 m2 . . . mn−1 0
0 0 . . . 0 m0 m1 . . . mn−2 mn−1
0 0 . . . 0 mn−1 m0 . . . mn−3 mn−2
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . 0 m2 m3 . . . m0 m1
0 0 . . . 0 m1 m2 . . . mn−1 m0


This matrix has the same determinant as the matrix:
H =


m0 m1 . . . mn−2 mn−1
mn−1 m0 . . . mn−3 mn−2
...
. . .
...
m2 m3 . . . m0 m1
m1 m2 . . . mn−1 m0


Therefore, if λ is odd, the determinant of SM,E and H
have the same parity.
Definition 3 Let P ∈ Z[X ] be a polynomial such that
P (X) = p0 + p1X + · · ·+ pn−1Xn−1. We denote by P
the polynomial in Rn such that: P (X) = p
′
0 + p
′
1X +
· · ·+ p′n−1Xn−1 where p′i = pimod (2).
Proposition 9 Let E(X) = Xn−λ such that λ is odd.
Let M = m0+m1X+ · · ·+mn−1Xn−1 be a polynomial
such that M ∈ L. Then M−1mod (E, φ) exists if and
only if gcd(M,Xn − 1) = 1.
Proof. The circulant matrix H, defined above, is such
that H = Φ(M). As M ∈ Rn, the determinant of H
is odd iff gcd(M,Xn − 1) = 1, using corollary 3. If λ
is odd, we showed above that the determinant of SM,E
and H have the same parity. So, Res(E,M) is odd iff
gcd(M,Xn − 1) = 1. That is, M−1mod (E, φ) exists if
and only if gcd(M,Xn − 1) = 1.
With a well chosen basis of L, we are now going to
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show that there always exists a small vector M such
that gcd(M,Xn − 1) = 1.
Let M2 be a basis of the lattice L such that:
M2 =


p 0 0 . . . 0 0
s1 1 0 . . . 0 0
s2 0 1 . . . 0 0
...
. . .
...
sn−2 0 0 . . . 1 0
sn−1 0 0 . . . 0 1


where: si = ti + p.ki with ti = (−γ)i (mod p) and
ki = ti (mod 2). Notice that all si are even (as p is
odd).
Proposition 10 Let G = {G1, . . . ,Gn} be a reduced ba-
sis of the lattice L obtained from the basis M2. Then,
there exists a linear combination (β1, . . . , βn) with βi ∈
{0, 1} such that M =∑ni=1 βiGi satisfies gcd(M,Xn −
1) = 1. Hence M−1mod (E, φ) exists.
Proof. First, we have that:
M2 =


1 0 0 . . . 0 0
0 1 0 . . . 0 0
0 0 1 . . . 0 0
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 . . . 1 0
0 0 0 . . . 0 1


whereM2ij =M2ij (mod 2). Each line i ofM2 corre-
sponds to the polynomial X i ∈ Rn, for 0 6 i < n. This
means that M2 is a basis of Rn.
Let U ∈ Rn be a polynomial such that gcd(U,Xn−1) =
1. AsM2 is a basis ofRn, it exists T = (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ Fn2
such that U = T.M2. As T.M2 = T.M2, we obtain
that U = T.M2.
We have T.M2 ∈ L, so there exists V = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈
Zn such that V.G = T.M2, as G is a basis of L. Thus,
U = V.G.
Let β = (β1, . . . , βn) ∈ Fn2 such that βi = vi (mod 2),
then we have U = β.G.
Let M ∈ L be a polynomial such that M =∑ni=1 βiGi,
then M = U , hence gcd(M,Xn − 1) = 1. Using propo-
sition 9, this proves that M−1mod (E, φ) exists.
Remark 6 From the preceeding proposition, at most 2n
linear combinations of elements of G must be computed
in order to find a suitable polynomial M . For crypto-
graphic sizes, n is small enough so that one can check
all these combinations (see examples in Appendix C, for
some possible values of n). Moreover, from proposition
9, if a combination leads to a polynomial M with an
even number of odd coefficients, then gcd(M,Xn − 1)
is a multiple of X − 1 (as 1 is a root of M in this case).
Thus,M−1mod (E, φ) doesn’t exist. Hence, such poly-
nomials M can be discarded.
Remark 7 Let θ = max
06i<n
‖Gi‖∞. For any of the 2n lin-
ear combinations, the corresponding polynomialM ver-
ifies ‖M‖∞ 6 nθ. Thus, if elements of G are small, then
‖M‖∞ will also be small, as n is small (and negligible
compared to θ).
3.4 Computation of representatives of powers of ρ
To compute the representatives of ρi , for 1 6 i < n,
needed for Algorithm 2, we first use Algorithm 3, with ρ
as input, to find a representative R of ρ.φ in the AMNS.
Then, using RedCoeff with R as input, we obtain a rep-
resentative of ρ. For any i > 2, we compute a represen-
tative of ρi by multiplying a representative of ρi−1 by
R, using Algorithm 6.
4 Implementation results
4.1 Theoretical performances and memory
consumption
The performances and the memory consumption of an
AMNS depend mainly on the target architecture and
the value of n which corresponds to the number of terms
of the underlying polynomials of the AMNS. The time
and space complexity of the AMNS operations mainly
depend on n.
Let’s consider that we have a k-bits processor archi-
tecture. In order to obtain an efficient AMNS, a good
idea is to take φ = 2k because in that case, division and
modular reduction by φ can be done with very simple
mask and shift operations. This choice makes the re-
duction modulo φ at line 1 and the division at line 3 of
algorithm 1 very cheap. This way, nk bits will be used
to store the AMNS representative of an integer. The
product of two elements involves O(n2) arithmetic op-
erations over k-bits integers and, using the trick men-
tionned in subsection 2.4, adding two elements needs
exactly n additions of k-bits integers.
4.2 Practical performances and memory consumption
4.2.1 About implementation: a C code generator.
Despite all the parameters needed for arithmetic opera-
tions in an AMNS, its software implementation is quite
easy. To prove that, we wrote with the SageMath library
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[18] a code that generates a C code for any AMNS, given
its complete set of parameters.
Our implementations of AMNS generation, the C code
generator and the AMNS we used for our numerical ex-
perimentation below are avalaible on GitHub:
https://github.com/eacElliptic/AMNS.
4.2.2 Computer features.
For our tests we used a Dell Precision Tower 3620 on
Ubuntu gnome 16.04-64 bits with an Intel Core i7-6700
processor and 32GB RAM. We compiled our tests with
gcc 5.4 using O3 compiling option and we compared
our results to GNU MP 6.1.1 and OpenSSL 1.0.2g im-
plementations. These libraries have also been compiled
with gcc with O3 option.
4.3 Numbers of AMNS for a given prime
An interesting but complex question is howmany AMNS
can be generated given a prime number for a target ar-
chitecture. This question is difficult to answer because
of the large range of parameters that define an AMNS
and also because it is linked to the existence of a nth-
root γ of a given λ in Z/pZ.
Here, we give an answer while focusing on the efficiency
of arithmetic operations. This will lead us to add some
constraints which will of course reduce the number of
AMNS.
Let us first assume that we have a k-bits architec-
ture. Once p is known, we have to choose the parameters
n, φ and λ. For any AMNS, we have: φ > 2|λ|nρ and
(2ρ)n > p. So, log2 |λ| 6 log2 φ− log2 n− (log2 p)/n. As
mentionned in subsection 4.1, for performance reasons,
we choose φ = 2k. Hence, n > log2 pk (as φ > ρ). Re-
member that n is the number of k-bits words used to
represent an integer. Hence we want n as small as pos-
sible to minimize the computation. Let’s assume that
we choose n such that
log2 p
k
+ 1 + c > n >
log2 p
k
,
i.e we allow at max c more coefficients than the opti-
mal value ⌊ log2 pk ⌋+1. According to subsection 4.1, the
smaller c is, the better performances and memory con-
sumption will be. Therefore, log2 n > log2 log2 p−log2 k
and log2 pn >
k log
2
p
log
2
p+kc+k . So, we finally have:
log2 |λ| < k + log2 k − log2 log2 p− k log2 plog
2
p+k.c+k
Let Ω = k + log2 k − log2 log2 p − k log2 plog
2
p+kc+k . To effi-
ciently compute the reduction modulo Xn−λ (external
reduction process), we choose λ such that λ = ±2i±2j,
where 0 6 i, j < Ω and i 6= j. Consequently, the num-
ber of values for λ is 4
(
Ω
2
)
.
Now, the main difficulty is to know how many nth-
root modulo p can be computed with this set of values
for λ. Notice that such a root may not exist for some
values of λ. To give an answer, we distinguish two case
according to gcd(n, p− 1).
4.3.1 Case 1 : gcd(n, p− 1) = 1.
Using corollary 1, we obtain that any value λ ∈ (Z/pZ)∗,
except 1, gives a useful nth-root modulo p. So, in this
case, one can generate at least 4
(
Ω
2
)− 1 AMNS.
4.3.2 Case 2 : gcd(n, p− 1) > 1.
This case is complex because finding whether or not
a value λ 6= 1 has a nth-root modulo p could lead to
solve a hard instance of the discrete logarithm problem
(see proposition 3). But, using corollary 2, we obtain
that one can generate at least gcd(n, p− 1)− 1 AMNS
(taking λ = 1).
Remark 8 In both cases above, we gave the minimum
numbers of AMNS that can be generated. Indeed, once
λ and γ = λ1/n (mod p) are fixed, the next parameter
to compute is the polynomial M using lattice reduc-
tion. From subsection 3.2, at least one polynomial in a
reduced basis of the lattice satisfies the required con-
straints on M . In fact, our practical experimentations
have shown that there are, most of the time, more than
one suitable candidate for M . Moreover, some linear
combinations of the polynomials of the reduced basis
give suitable candidates for M . For a tuple (p, n, λ, γ),
different suitable candidates for M lead to different
AMNS. So, one can generate much more AMNS than
the minimum numbers we gave using some linear com-
binations of the polynomials of the reduced basis.
Example 2 We generated a set of AMNS for some primes
of size 192, 224, 256, 384 and 521 bits. These sizes cor-
respond to the NIST recommended key sizes for ellip-
tic curve cryptography. For this experiment, we took
k = 64 and c = 2 (so, we allow at max 2 more coeffi-
cients than the optimal value ⌊ log2 p64 ⌋+1, which is quite
restrictive but good for performances). Remember that
Ω = k + log2 k − log2 log2 p− k log2 plog
2
p+kc+k .
As already said, the main difficulty in the generation
process is the computation of γ a nth-root modulo p
of λ. For our test, we used the library SageMath which
uses the algorithm proposed in [11] for this operation.
As it can take a lot of time, we fixed in our code a time-
out of thirty minutes. So, some values of λ that have
nth-roots might have been discarded. Finally, to extend
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the numbers of AMNS according to the remark above,
we only checked all binary combinations of lattices ele-
ments; a larger set should lead to more AMNS.
With these parameters and constraints, the table 2 gives
the number of AMNS we found for each prime. We call
these primes p192, p224, p256, p384 and p521 accord-
ing to their bit sizes (see Appendix B for their values).
The recommended NIST prime p = 2521 − 1 is denoted
by nist p521.
Prime number p192 p224 p256
Number of AMNS 10418 5118 11877
Prime number p384 p521 nist p521
Number of AMNS 14787 19871 85592
Table 2: A lower bound on the number of distinct
AMNS for some prime integers, using a timer of 30
minutes for nth-root computation.
4.3.3 Numerical experimentation.
For each NIST recommended key size for elliptic curve
cryptography (i.e 192, 224, 256, 384 and 521 bits), we
have generated a set of AMNS for many primes of that
size, see Appendix C for some exemples of AMNS. As
in example 2, we took k = 64 and φ = 2k. So, for
software implementation, the optimal value for n is
nopt = ⌊ log2 pk ⌋ + 1. We also took c = 2, which means
that for each prime, we have generated AMNS with
n equals to nopt, nopt + 1 and nopt + 2. Then, with
each AMNS, we have computed 225 modular multipli-
cations using the AMNS representatives of random el-
ements. With the same inputs, we have also computed
the 225 modular multiplications with the well known li-
brairies GNUMP [10] and OpenSSL [17]. For OpenSSL,
we used the default modular multiplication procedure
and Montgomery modular multiplication already im-
plemented.
Table 3 gives the ratio between the performances
obtained for the AMNS and the performances obtained
for GNU MP and OpenSSL. We computed these ratios
for n equals to nopt, nopt + 1 and nopt + 2.
Table 5 gives the memory consumption to store an
integer modulo p using the AMNS, GNUMP and OpenSSL,
where n = nopt for the AMNS. More precisely, we give
the number of 64-bits integers used to represent the ele-
ments of Z/pZ. For GNU MP and OpenSSL, we give in
Appendix E the source code corresponding to the struc-
ture used for storing an integer with these libraries.
p size 192 224
n 4 5 6 4 5 6
ratio 1 0.86 1.41 2.04 0.57 0.98 1.41
ratio 2 0.10 0.17 0.24 0.08 0.14 0.19
ratio 3 0.21 0.34 0.49 0.16 0.27 0.39
p size 256 384
n 5 6 7 7 8 9
ratio 1 0.98 1.42 1.84 0.98 1.34 1.67
ratio 2 0.14 0.20 0.26 0.19 0.25 0.31
ratio 3 0.30 0.43 0.55 0.43 0.58 0.73
p size 521
n 10 11 12
ratio 1 0.95 1.18 1.36
ratio 2 0.25 0.29 0.34
ratio 3 0.56 0.69 0.80
ratio 1: AMNS/OpenSSL Montgomery modular mult.
ratio 2: AMNS/OpenSSL default modular mult.
ratio 3: AMNS/GNU MP mult. + modular reduction
Table 3: Relative performances of AMNS vs GNU MP
and OpenSSL modular multiplications, with n equals
to nopt, nopt + 1 and nopt + 2 for the AMNS.
As it can be seen in table 3, the AMNS performs
modular multiplication much more efficiently than the
librairy GNU MP and the default method in OpenSSL
for all values of n in the table. We can also observe that
AMNS modular multiplication is slightly faster than
the Montgomery method in OpenSSL when the value
of n is optimal.
Table 3 gives the mean ratio for each pair (size of p,
n). In table 4, we give the best ratios obtained when
n = nopt for AMNS. These ratios are obtained when λ
is very small with good shape. For example, ±1 or ±2.
For size of p and n equals to 224 and 4 respectively,
it can be observed that the obtained ratio overperforms
the others ratios. In this case, to represent an integer
of Z/pZ, AMNS, GNU MP and OpenSSL use the same
number of k-bits blocks. As elements are polynomials in
AMNS, there is no carry to manage. Thus, arithmetic
operations are a lot faster. In the other cases, AMNS use
at least one more block than GNU MP and OpenSSL.
Remark 9 When the size of p is 521 bits, the optimal
value for n is 9. With our constraints on k, φ, λ and
the timer we used to compute a nth-root modulo p of
λ, we did not find an AMNS with n = 9. So, for this
size, ratios where computed with n equals to nopt + 1,
nopt + 2 and nopt + 3.
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(p size, n) (192, 4) (224, 4) (256, 5)
ratio 1 0.77 0.56 0.91
ratio 2 0.09 0.08 0.13
ratio 3 0.19 0.16 0.28
(p size, n) (384, 7) (521, 10)
ratio 1 0.92 0.91
ratio 2 0.18 0.24
ratio 3 0.40 0.54
ratio 1: AMNS/OpenSSL Montgomery modular mult.
ratio 2: AMNS/OpenSSL default modular mult.
ratio 3: AMNS/GNU MP mult. + modular reduction
Table 4: Relative performances of AMNS vs GNU MP
and OpenSSL modular multiplications, with n equals
to nopt for the AMNS (best ratios).
Moreover, in our implementations, we did not take
advantage of the high parallelisation capability of AMNS,
which should make arithmetic operations much faster.
This parallelisation capability comes from the polyno-
mial structure of the elements in AMNS.
In fact, using parallelisation, one could divide by n the
execution time of line 1 of algorithm 6 as the coeffi-
cients of the result V can be computed independently
in the same time. Likewise, the same thing can be done
with all the lines of the RedCoeff method (algorithm
1), which is called in algorithm 6.
An AMNS addition should always be faster because
it is simply a polynomial addition without carries to
manage, unlike classic binary representations. It should
even be better with parallelisation.
Remark 10 Although, AMNS is a lot faster than GNU
MP and OpenSSL default method for modular multi-
plication, the most relevant ratio in table 3 is ratio1 be-
cause AMNS requires roughly the same amount of data
to precompute than the Montgomery modular multipli-
cation.
Size in bits of p 192 224 256 384 521
AMNS 4 4 5 7 10
GNU MP (mpz t) 4 5 5 7 10
OpenSSL (BIGNUM) 5 6 6 8 11
Table 5: Number of 64 bits words used to store elements
of Z/pZ, where n equals to nopt for the AMNS.
In table 5, it can be observed that the memory con-
sumptions of AMNS and GNU MP are most of the time
the same while OpenSSL consumes more memory.
Notice that for AMNS and OpenSSLMontgomery, some
data must be precomputed, but the memory consump-
tions of these data are negligible compared to the over-
all usage of memory when performing multiple arith-
metic operations.
Remark 11 In special cases where the polynomials M
and M ′ of an AMNS have many coefficients equal to
zero, the RedCoeff (algorithm 1) method becomes very
fast. This leads to a very efficient modular multipli-
cation process. As an example, for the recommended
NIST prime p = 2521− 1, we found such an AMNS (see
Appendix A for its parameters). With this AMNS, us-
ing the same inputs for 225 iterations of modular mul-
tiplications, we obtained interesting timings that are
collected in table 6.
p = 2521 − 1, n = 10
ratio1 ratio2 ratio3
0.42 0.09 0.27
ratio 1: AMNS/OpenSSL Montgomery modular mult.
ratio 2: AMNS/OpenSSL default modular mult.
ratio 3: AMNS/GNU MP mult. + modular reduction
Table 6: Example of relative performances of AMNS vs
GNU MP and OpenSSL modular multiplications when
reduction polynomials are sparse
This efficiency for this specific modulus is due to
the fact that the two polynomial multiplications by
M and M ′ in the RedCoeff method are very cheap as
these polynomials have most of their coefficients equal
to zero.
So, independently of the value of n, the sparser are M
and M ′, the better are the performances.
4.4 About side channel attacks
AMNS have very interesting properties regarding side
channel attacks.
4.4.1 Regular algorithms.
All the described algorithms (conversions, addition and
multiplication) contain no conditional branching which
is one of the basic weaknesses used in some side channel
attacks, like the simple power analysis (SPA).
4.4.2 Many AMNS for a given prime.
Given a tuple (p, n, λ), if a nth-root (modulo p) γ of λ
exists, we know from proposition 3 that the total num-
ber of such roots is gcd(n, p−1) and each of these roots
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allows to build at least one AMNS for the same prime
p. Moreover, corollaries 1 and 2 show that for any pair
(p, n), it is always possible to choose λ ∈ Z, and easily
find γ, such that γn (mod p) ≡ λ. This means that it is
always possible to generate many AMNS, given a prime
p. In fact, with our implementation, we were able to
generate thousands of AMNS for many modulus using
restrictive conditions (see table 2 in example 2). This
property is very interesting because, most of the time,
side channel attacks use patterns (and hypothesis) to
find secret data. With many AMNS for a given modu-
lus, it becomes difficult to build (or find) such patterns
as it is expected that any AMNS will have its specific
behaviour for arithmetic operations.
4.4.3 Unpredictable shape of a representative.
Finally, the difference between the representatives of
an element from one AMNS to another will make side
channel attacks much more complex. As an example,
we generated three AMNS for the prime p = 2255 + 95,
and considered the representatives of the element
t = 4D9B499C5B883B0F11752FBEED0684B6972
F588DB67810835002A07C2F2AC804 ∈ Z/pZ in these
AMNS; see Appendix D for their parameters.
In AMNS 1, a representative of t is: X3.
In AMNS 2, a representative of t is:
−0x39CDC4224C412.X4 − 0x3F60F0AC55927.X3 +
0x7BD09DBD01E4.X2 − 0x4B844B52F420E.X −
0x2DE4B18019BCF .
In AMNS 3, a representative of t is:
−0x152DDD219CC.X5 + 0x3080218E9FD.X4 −
0x225BF4D6DE9.X3 + 0x672A6C1F62E.X2 −
0x3E6242D6F01.X + 0x7DEE4F8F11E.
As it can be observed, these representatives of t vary
a lot. This behaviour should make side channel attacks
much more complex as it will introduce some kind of
randomness in power consumptions for example.
4.4.4 A simple DPA countermeasure for ECC.
In [12], the authors show how to randomize the base
point P to thwart DPA attacks. The main idea is to
change the (x, y) coordinates of P by (u−2x, u−3y) for
a random u ∈ (Z/pZ)×. Such a countermeasure can eas-
ily be implemented in the AMNS conversion procedure.
The conversion algorithms (from binary representation
to AMNS and vice-versa) are modified to take an extra
argument used to change the representative of x and
y (see algorithms 8 and 9). Hence before the computa-
tion of kP , the procedures DPA Conv 2 AMNS(x,u−2)
and DPA Conv 2 AMNS(y,u−3) are called. Once the
computation done a call to DPA Conv 2 BIN(x,u2) and
DPA Conv 2 BIN(y,u3) allows to find back the coordi-
nates of kP .
Algorithm 8 DPA Conv 2 AMNS(a,β)
Require: a ∈ Z/pZ B = (p, n, γ, ρ, E), and β ∈
(Z/pZ)×
Ensure: A ≡ (aβ.φ)B
1: b = (aβ.φ2)mod p
2: b = (bn−1, ..., b0)ρ
3: U ←
n−1∑
i=0
bi.Pi(X)
4: A← RedCoeff(U)
5: return A
Algorithm 9 DPA Conv 2 BIN(A,β)
Require: A ∈ B, B = (p, n, γ, ρ, E) and β ∈ (Z/pZ)×
Ensure: a = A(γ).φ−1 mod p
1: A← RedCoeff(A)
2: a← 0
3: for i = n− 1 . . . 0 do
4: a← (aγ +Ai)mod p
5: end for
6: return aβ mod p
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we generalized some results in [13] to
a bigger set of polynomials E. We presented a com-
plete set of algorithms for arithmetic and conversion
operations in the AMNS and shown how to generate
all parameters needed for these algorithms. Our imple-
mentations have shown that AMNS allow to perform
modular operations more efficiently than well known li-
brairies like GNU MP and OpenSSL. They can even be
much more efficient if their high parallelisation capa-
bility is used. Finally we brought some arguments and
elements to point out that AMNS should be considered
as a potential countermeasure in the context of side
channel attacks.
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Appendix A Example of AMNS for the NIST
recommended 521-bits prime integer for ECC
– p = 2521 − 1
– n = 10
– λ = 2
– ρ = 258
– γ = 2469
– E(X) = X10 − 2
– M(X) = 252.X − 1
– M ′(Y ) = 252.Y + 1
Appendix B List of prime numbers used for
table 2
– p192 = 0xE06F20509A52674228D4F0701A08EB3B08C1
714F0A93F719
– p224 = 0xE886C555B533B33B037F4F356CB97E00B56
0DD1B5A9C252CCEAF301B
– p256 = 0x8FFB5E3E4BD153C220C28FDBA587F9C23
D454DBE31C17D0B44462E26684B46E5
– p384 = 0xF3D1CD992E8EA43D29612F131C05A03215F
247E92951AB3D741FEA820526FD185CDBEC7AEFC3
1F75BEA2D2F4F43D1547
– p521 = 0x15683E5BD61DA4E3A10A95DE122E3B015F
AC3F355F6360F33FA19D036CA02897BAF3D615ADA
F6508A1E5B325B0345F39505A7B84ED01A8F913CA0
D6395A9E135BE3
Appendix C Examples of AMNS for different
primes
In this section, we give some examples of the AMNS we used
in subsection 4.2 for our numerical experimentation. All these
AMNS have the common parameter φ = 264.
C.1 AMNS 1: 192-bits prime number.
– p = 0xE06F20509A52674228D4F0701A08EB3B08C171
4F0A93F719
– n = 4
– λ = −1
– ρ = 251
– γ = 0x7AB09A124AA5065B2E20034E0D0FE3D0A
5F2A276C33E2515
– E(X) = X4 + 1
– M(X) = 0x4B3D12868945.X3 − 0x924097D431D8.X2 +
0x39B561D62725.X + 0xC580DC0A05E3
– M ′(Y ) = 0x6E2B6D9BAF275F4F.Y 3 +
0x8F59D05762288B18.Y 2 + 0x69A1F846105E39CF.Y
+ 0xBEDE53CF67CF2747
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C.2 AMNS 2: 224-bits prime number.
– p = 0xE886C555B533B33B037F4F356CB97E00B560
DD1B5A9C252CCEAF301B
– n = 4
– λ = −2
– ρ = 260
– γ = 0x64892FE7A2B9E28E496952B025FE138C22382
6010F31C90E9354AFEF
– E(X) = X4 + 2
– M(X) = −0x6A2300C9FAC40E.X3
− 0xE12EC6DCB579A6.X2 − 0x272839DE2E827E.X
− 0x43419ADAFCFB61
– M ′(Y ) = 0x7D4F705603D9CE42.Y 3
+ 0xE0922181D0445FA6.Y 2 + 0x5A4FA29325678B32.Y
+ 0xDDDE890AB0458D59
C.3 AMNS 3: 256-bits prime number.
– p = 0x8FFB5E3E4BD153C220C28FDBA587F9C23D454
DBE31C17D0B44462E26684B46E5
– n = 5
– λ = 2
– ρ = 255
– γ = 0x42559355ED8CAAA92688CE0A9322458EE4372
4D997327755F385B1901F25E507
– E(X) = X5 − 2
– M(X) = −0x7F360937497B.X4−0x45FB30302B149.X3−
0x1910C5989E6B8.X2 − 0x28750BDCB9CA3.X +
0x3935AF11550E5
– M ′(Y ) = 0x6AC1B8BE18685FC6.Y 4 +
0x1E8123E1FA66C4B2.Y 3+0x5C7430F9C82014D1.Y 2+
0x33A24848D6BF6427.Y + 0xCC7C0CE54B67A803
C.4 AMNS 4: 384-bits prime number.
– p = 0xF3D1CD992E8EA43D29612F131C05A03215F24
7E92951AB3D741FEA820526FD185CDBEC7AEFC31
F75BEA2D2F4F43D1547
– n = 7
– λ = 2
– ρ = 259
– γ = 0xA5C4FB2BBF7D447D0E58D14E3F440AD5C7
A0BB773BCFA856914ED875B1A8B3DD5C6327E24B
34890BDA7782DE3050EEC4
– E(X) = X7 − 2
– M(X) = 0x2B70420C25B6F9.X6 +
0x27597E8FAEFBA6.X5 + 0x2A259AA4E719E1.X4 +
0x12391F5D00D4A7.X3 − 0x26AC55039EACFD.X2 +
0x2747CE657C0F2D.X − 0x426A85C33ACE17
– M ′(Y ) = 0x36E06AB70DC02E0C.Y 6 +
0x91EC3470F30AB1DD.Y 5+0x521BCB522168C88C.Y 4+
0x51579EF6AC4A01C8.Y 3+0x7145B435BA15791A.Y 2+
0xCCD28607261C6227.Y + 0x4E6A294F1FBE2093
C.5 AMNS 5: 521-bits prime number.
– p = 0x15683E5BD61DA4E3A10A95DE122E3B015FAC
3F355F6360F33FA19D036CA02897BAF3D615ADAF6
508A1E5B325B0345F39505A7B84ED01A8F913CA0D6
395A9E135BE3
– n = 10
– λ = −2
– ρ = 257
– γ = 0x3BEB85F1AC84420C044C472B8845A1896C68A
CD6C78773C9392B6CE871027BD5C333EF238A11733
384E0A7318139218D99ADDCBB39694C1207938B6CA
6789BC3B1
– E(X) = X10 + 2
– M(X) = −0x3D52F259CF52C.X9 −
0x2F155A2F83CC6.X8 + 0x3C5398A0AA3D2.X7 −
0x6161944D2155C.X6 + 0x92266960FE012.X5 −
0x68DFAA2817992.X4 − 0x996D8B98C7860.X3 −
0x31E83951B9F38.X2 + 0x3E716C4C0B2A4.X +
0x3304421CB90FD
– M ′(Y ) = 0xBA9CFB5216CEA3CC.Y 9 +
0x4DD219C801C0DD06.Y 8+0x10DEC022F71CC8F2.Y 7+
0x199161BB290DEE2C.Y 6+0x924D10687452E482.Y 5+
0x7F6A883FEED1B396.Y 4+0x6923B242682C1CA0.Y 3+
0x76FA75CEF1B36AC8.Y 2+0xBD1EDFD16FA95474.Y +
0xC7E79022CD8CD813
Appendix D Examples of AMNS for the same
prime
Common parameters:
– p = 2255 + 95
– φ = 264
D.1 AMNS 1.
– n = 5
– λ = 2
– ρ = 255
– γ = 0x4A11EC963214E75587B184AF9B09E8871D0DF599
1483661DE2FF6BB1E251199C
– E(X) = X5 − 2
– M(X) = −0x28AE865829ED0.X4 −
0x3B47735E8CB55.X3 + 0x1337D2969BC11.X2 −
0x46647D3BC6C24.X + 0x2B2A32D7CA88B
– M ′(Y ) = 0x8FAC8FCFD4AA8587.Y 4 +
0xB10CC0B3B58C223.Y 3+0xCA57491651A44CBB.Y 2+
0x4E154808B257394C.Y + 0x7C5906E698B85DD
D.2 AMNS 2.
– n = 5
– λ = −3
– ρ = 256
– γ = 0x1EBF5A56EC92F9F46C7F0870E5E3702D3E83
83DEAF56E4B4C3D368BD0BF3BD40
– E(X) = X5 + 3
– M(X) = −0x258AA3DB7ADC.X4 −
0x1C961F979254D.X3 + 0x1D9EAFCB6057C.X2 −
0x3CE080AECD314.X − 0x539D41F2093E8
– M ′(Y ) = 0x6F5067DF289E2148.Y 4 +
0x4D82701329D99964.Y 3+0x1194DEB36C42D649.Y 2+
0x823B9BE066BDC6EC.Y + 0x1B04ECB8AF0D910C
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D.3 AMNS 3.
– n = 6
– λ = 2
– ρ = 247
– γ = 0x27CDB601B497003ABAE910DB0E0031133262F7
B71DA49112F58965B98FC4930D
– E(X) = X6 − 2
– M(X) = 0x1BDD53B3E8.X5 +
0x3817CA92D94.X4 − 0x365442524AC.X3 +
0xE287722432.X2 − 0x2846C0EFDE3.X +
0x322D02D3281
– M ′(Y ) = 0xA2133E675175BDD3.Y 5 +
0xB61E25558E691783.Y 4+0x89E8235276FDFBCB.Y 3+
0x59D0C2AAB489D4AF.Y 2+0xF4592CC3EF0FD023.Y +
0xD176E217D4A7BD85
Appendix E Integers structures in GNU MP
and OpenSSL
In this section, we give the integer structures in GNU MP
and OpenSSL. These are the structures we used to compute
memory cunsomptions in table 5.
GNU MP mpz t structure :
typedef struct
{
int _mp_alloc; /* Number of *limbs* allocated and pointed to by the ’_mp_d’ field. */
int _mp_size; /* abs(_mp_size) is the number of limbs the last field points to. If _mp_size is negative this
is a negative number. */
mp_limb_t *_mp_d; /* Pointer to the limbs. */
} __mpz_struct;
In GNU MP mpz t structure, there are 2 integers of type
int and an array of type mp limb t. On the computer we
used for our tests (see features at subsection 4.2), int is 32
bits wide and mp limb t is 64 bits wide. In the computa-
tion of memory consumption, we considered the 2 integers
of type int as one integer of 64 bits. For more details, see :
https://gmplib.org/manual/Integer-Internals.html .
OpenSSL bignum st structure :
struct bignum_st
{
BN_ULONG *d; /* Pointer to an array of ’BN_BITS2’ bit chunks. */
int top; /* Index of last used d +1. */
/* The next are internal book keeping for bn_expand. */
int dmax; /* Size of the d array. */
int neg; /* one if the number is negative */
int flags;
};
In OpenSSL bignum st structure, there are 4 integers of type
int and an array of type BN ULONG, which is 64 bits wide
(on our computer). In memory consumption computation, we
considered the 4 integers of type int as two 64-bit integers. For
more details, see : https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.0.2/crypto/bn_internal.html
